The avalanche of national health insurance (NHI) bills, introduced in the Congress reflects voter dissatisfaction with the present pay ment arrangements and the continuously rising cost of medical care. Three broad areas of concern are the subject of this legisla tion; they are briefly denoted as: (1) coverage or the extent of benefits; (2) payment or the financing provisions; (3) governance or the implementation of the NHI program and planning its future. Many issues are being raised as the debate continues; their resolu tion could have a profound impact on the future of the entire health care delivery system. Hence, the implications of a proposed na tional health insurance law should be viewed in the framework of a long-term rather than a short-term perspective.
The present paper focuses on the financing provisions and their effects on equity in distributing health care services and al-3 3 8 locating the burden of paying for them. To be equitable, medical care would have to be " income blind." The consumption of medical services would have to be independent of income, and payments would have to be unrelated to utilization. The financing mechanism, which is instrumental to removing the nexus between services and payment, would have to be based on income so that the cost of medical care could be universally and equally shared.
The concern with a fair distribution of medical services stems from their unique and sometimes crucial role in prolonging life, curing disease, and relieving pain. Illness is a universal hazard which strikes across all income classes; but the medical technology essential to accurate diagnosis and effective treatment can only seldom be fitted to income size. Insurance protection is, therefore, sought in an attempt to avoid the financial distress of large medical bills.
The principle of insurance implies that either all or a substan tial portion of the funds required to finance covered services are obtained through prepayment. The prepayment amounts can be named " premium" or " tax." When a premium is mandated by the government, it is in effect compulsory; and a compulsory payment by any name is equivalent to a tax whether levied by the govern ment or by a private organization. If part of the covered medical services are directly paid or " cost-shared" by the consumers of the services, then the level of premium or tax levy can be reduced ac cordingly. A high level of cost sharing by the users of medical facilities can reduce substantially the level of premiums paid by all insured persons; it can make an insurance plan considerably more attractive to a large number of persons who would not expect to use medical facilities immediately.
The major bills before the Congress reflect some minimum common denominator of agreement. They all specify some form of (1) subsidized health insurance for the poor and (2) protection against catastrophic expenses for the entire population. But they differ on (1) what is an adequate level of medical assistance; (2) what constitutes a catastrophic expenditure level; (3) what is the desirable mix of indirect (prepaid) and direct (cost-shared) finan cing. Without reference to individual bills, this paper discusses the broad characteristics of their financing specifications and examines their implications for sharing the burdens of prepayments and de termining the distribution of benefits and services. Section I out Summer 1975 / Health and Society / M M F Q lines some of the provisions for indirect financing, and Section II describes some of the cost-sharing requirements. Section III ex amines the m erit' of these payment arrangements and their policy implications. Finally, a concluding section suggests some policy guidelines and recommendations.
Indirect Financing of Medical Care
Indirect financing of medical services can take the form of a pre mium or a tax which can be based either on insurance risk or on in come. The base determines who shoulders the burden of prepay ment for care. The premium levels which are set by private in surance organizations are experience-rated; they are based on insurance risks, and are designed to reflect differences in protec tion due to these risks. Premiums that are determined by risk can vary widely among persons with equal income; or they can be equal for persons with widely different income levels. For any given risk level, the burden of paying such a premium becomes easier as income increases. Alternatively, premium levels that in crease with income distribute the burden in an equitable way. But such income-related payments would require information on in dividual incomes. By virtue of its authority to collect income taxes, the government is legally entitled to such information, and no one else is. Thus, in effect, only the government can secure an equita ble sharing in the burden of paying for medical care.
The issue of equity in indirect financing permeates every bill; and though the bills differ in their specific provisions, they can nevertheless be classified into two groups with respect to the in surance base which they specify. One group of bills stipulates that premium levels should be proportional to income or earnings at least up to a specified ceiling; the size of the premium is determined on a basis which applies equally to the entire population and its amounts will be collected by the federal government. Another mandates that premiums are to be paid to private insurance or ganizations. The bills in this group specify what share of the pre mium is directly paid by the policyholders and what share is paid by them indirectly through their employers; the level of the pre mium is left to negotiation between the policyholders or their employers and the insurance carriers. Enrollment in the private in surance plan is usually voluntary for the employee but obligatory for the employer. Individuals who are either self-employed or un employed are entitled to purchase individual policies for which the premium levels are higher than those paid in group insurance. Thus, such premium levels paid for private insurance protection reflect not only differences in risk but also in employment status.
At present, the coverage of private health insurance, which is based on risk, differs greatly among persons with different in comes. Insurance against the cost of hospital and surgical services, which is the most common form of health insurance, is not un iversal and varies with income. DHEW (1972 : Tables 3 and 17) . f*Very small bTotal exceeds the sum of the components because it includes persons whose family income is not known. so did the percentage of persons who stated that they could not af ford to pay the insurance premium. Results of a similar nature were obtained from a Social Security survey (Kolodrubetz, 1974) of group health insurance coverage among full-time employees; at least 40 percent of persons with wages and salaries under $5,000 but only 10 percent of all individuals earning over $9,000 in 1971 had no group health insurance coverage.
To counteract the effect of fixed premiums that are high re lative to income, some bills specify direct and explicit subsidies. However, since the level of such direct subsidies depend on in come, " means" or income tests would have to be used to de termine eligibility. As such, these subsidies would create " notch" problems similar to those that have plagued so many other social programs.1 Moreover, though the national health insurance bills propose these subsidies for the poor and near-poor, they also permit an indirect subsidy, through the federal income tax, for the premiums paid under the regular employer-employee and in dividual plans. And as Table 2 shows, when income levels in crease, such subsidies constitute an increasingly larger proportion of the premium level. Thus, while the explicit subsidies for pre miums paid by the low-and moderate-income groups are expected to fall off as income increases, the implicit, or tax-shelter, subsidies actually increase with income. By contrast, premiums collected as a social insurance tax do not qualify for such a tax exemption.
The most prevalent form of private insurance is group in surance through employment, where the employer has the responsibility for negotiating the premium levels with the insurance organization and for collecting premiums on its behalf. Premiums are determined according to the insurance risk, which is based on the past experience of the group. Since an employer often pays MMFQ / H ealth and Society / Summer 1975 'The "n o tch " (or slight) increase in income can result in a " cliff' (or large) decrease in the subsidy. The notch problem (as it is called) results from an abrupt, instead of a smooth, change in the level of benefits at the boundary of each income class that is subsidized. An example, taken from the Nixon administration's pro posal in 1974, can serve to illustrate this point. Suppose an individual who earns $5,200 pays $120 as a premium: if his income increases to $5,400, his premium in creases to $240. Thus a $200 additional income gives rise to a $120 additional pay ment; the net income at his disposal is $80. Individuals so affected have an incen tive to deliberately keep their income from rising, as they will find it hardly worthwhile to make the effort. Mitchell and Vogel (1972: 12, Table 4 ), aThe subsidy is defined as the amount of unpaid income taxes due to the exemption of income from the federal income tax (alsoreferred toas "taxexpenditure"). This is the definition of income used by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
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directly a considerable portion of the premium, such an arrange ment provides an incentive for both the carrier and the employer to exclude high-risk persons from the insurance plan; and if such an exclusion is forbidden, there is strong incentive to a bar a high-risk person from employment altogether. Most bills specify that an in dividual who is not an employee can qualify for an individual policy or enroll in a government plan. But individual policyholders would have to pay much higher premium levels than comparable mem bers of a group plan.2 Thus, depending on insurance risk and employment status, premium levels can be high relative to a non poor income. Yet, there is nothing inherent in a national health in surance program that requires it to be tied to employment. It is only a historical accident that health insurance has become a fringe benefit of employment. In periods of unemployment, such nexus creates additional hardships for unemployed persons, removing not only earnings as a source of income, but taking away their health insurance protection as well, or subjecting them to the much higher premiums of an individual policy.
2The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare estimated that, in 1975, the average individual policy would amount to $900, compared to a group policy of $600 per family. For an annual income of $10,000, the premium on an individual policy would be 9 percent of income. (See Waldman, 1974.) 
Cost-Sharing Requirements and the Distribution of Benefits
Direct participation by consumers of medical services in paying their bills has gained widespread acceptance. It can serve as a sub stitute source of revenue to defray the cost of medical services, making an insurance plan more attractive to enrollees who do not anticipate heavy utilization of medical facilities. Cost sharing has several forms: initial full payments (deductibles), partial payments (copayments or coinsurance amounts), an upper limit either on the carrier's liability or on the patient's responsibility for medical pay ments. All bills before the Congress propose some upper limit on the patient's liability, but they differ with respect to the method of determining the ceiling or the level at which it would be set. Yet, in comparison with the present situation, when the patient's liability is open-ended and the carrier's limited, any of the proposed pro visions for insurance protection against catastrophic expenses con stitutes a relief. Cost-sharing amounts that are based either on the level of medical bills or on the number of units of service consumed are in sensitive to income. These amounts, the same at different income levels, constitute a decreasing portion of income as income in creases; their restraining effect gradually disappears as income levels rise. Hence, high-income persons are likely to pass the level of initial deductible and to reach a fixed income limit of catastrophic protection more often than persons who, because of their low or moderate income, are deterred or restricted by the cost-sharing provisions. A proportionally larger share of benefits from the national health insurance program would, therefore, be diverted to high-or middle-income persons at the expense of their low-or moderate-income counterparts.
The experience with Medicare and Medicaid can serve to il lustrate this point. As the first federal health insurance program, Medicare specified cost-sharing requirements based on the level of medical bills and on the number of hospital days; these have been applied equally across all income levels without any ceiling on the patient's liability for cost-sharing amounts. Such provisions are highly restrictive to low-and moderate-income enrollees but much less so to their middle-and high-income peers. As Davis and
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Reynolds (1973) demonstrate, the level of reimbursed amounts is considerably higher for high-income enrollees than for enrollees with low and moderate incomes. Table 3 shows that in 1968, the re imbursement levels were twice as high for persons with incomes over $15,000 than for persons with incomes under $5,000; and 28 percent more persons at the upper end of the income scale received reimbursable services. The same authors' study of Medicaid in 1969 (in press) shows that removal of financial barriers improves remarkably the access to and the use of medical facilities by the poor. The recipients of public assistance used physician services at the same rate as middle-income persons with comparable health problems, while other low-income persons lagged substantially behind in the use of medical services. Mindful of such findings, all bills that specify positive cost-sharing amounts stipulate reduced and income-based cost sharing for the poor and the elderly. This policy is likely to create an additional " notch" problem.
The proponents of cost sharing as a policy tool see in it not on ly a source of payment for medical care, but also a rationing de vice. As such, it is designed to counteract the adverse effects that could be induced by extending greater financial protection to more persons. Yet the bills which stipulate positive cost sharing also permit, or even encourage, private supplementary insurance against the personal outlay for deductibles and copayments. The experience with Medicare (Mueller, 1975) suggests that such sup plementary private insurance coverage would indeed be quite widespread; in 1973 about 60 percent of all the elderly (12.4 million Davis and Reynolds (1973 : Tables I and 2) . aSMI is Supplementary Medical Insurance or Medicare Part B. Services covered by this program are subject to an initial deductible ($50 in 1968) and a 20 percent coinsurance rate on all "allowable charges." b 1969 data. 345 persons) had at least some form of private insurance against the cost of hospital care. And this practice does not encourage restraint behavior. Peel and Scharff s study (1973) of ambulatory patients under Medicare in 1969 shows that proportionally more persons obtained covered services and met the initial deductible amounts if they had complementary out-of-hospital insurance cov erage than if they had none and had low or moderate incomes. Moreover, the government, through its tax treatment of private health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket payments for medical care obviates any expected restraining effects; and since it does so by conferring a disparate advantage on the upper-and up per-middle-income taxpayers, it helps direct medical services to these groups at the expense of their moderate-income coun terparts.
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Policy Implications
National health insurance as a financing policy that is designed to protect the consumers of health care services can be expected to sever or at least weaken the nexus between the distribution of in come and the distribution of medical services. It can achieve this goal by using prepayments as the major source of funds to pay for medical care. The prepayment arrangements can be so structured as to distribute the cost of medical care equitably across the entire population by linking prepayment levels to income, keeping amounts proportional to income over the entire scale.3 Moreover, the prepayment arrangements have to be " employment blind" and " risk blind." If they are linked to employment, then self-employed and unemployed persons pay higher premiums than employees. If they are based on risks, then high-risk individuals pay higher pre miums than low-risk individuals. The principle of national health insurance, of pooling the risks and granting equal entitlement to benefits irrespective of employment or risk, would be violated; persons with the " wrong" employment or risk status would be sub ject to a higher levy before they were entitled to the same benefits as their " right" counterparts.
Social insurance is blind to both employment and risk, but private insurance is not. Social insurance can be sensitive to in come,4 and private insurance cannot. Moreover, private insurance organizations are more likely to incur higher collection costs than the government would. The government, as an established tax col lector, is well equipped to handle the collection of prepayment amounts at a small marginal cost and without any marketing and advertising costs which are incurred by competing private or ganizations and passed on to their policyholders. Thus, in the final analysis, only the government can secure an equitable distribution of the burden, and secure it at least cost to the paying public.
A national health insurance program, if financed solely through prepayments, is expected to increase the overall demand for medical services and especially the demand for those services for which there has been very little insurance coverage before the implementation of a national program (Newhouse et al., 1974) . Such demand increases may stem from the increase in the number of persons using services as well as from the quantity of services used by each person. The pressures may be felt more strongly in the near term than in the long run, because the catch-up demand can be expected to reach a saturation point after a few years. Yet, since the short-run supply of services may not keep pace with the demand, the equilibrating mechanism could result in rising costs and/or longer queues for appointments. Alternative policies have been suggested to reduce the excess demand. On the demand side they include: (1) a gradual " phase-in" of population groups (possibly by age and services); (2) direct participation by the con sumers of services in sharing the cost of their consumption. On the supply side they include direct regulations of the " providers" in order to control the cost of medical care directly or give indirect in centives to achieve the same purpose.
The advocates of direct patient participation in paying medical bills hope to induce a cost-conscious behavior on the part of the consumers and give them a strong incentive to police the market against the rising cost of heatlh care services. Evidence from crosssectional studies, based on micro-data, suggests that spending on Summer 1975 / Health and Society / M M F Q 4To base premiums on income would require information on individual incomes. Only the government is legally entitled to such information, which it obtains because all taxpayers are required to file an annual income statement. such services is not insensitive to differences in the cost-sharing amounts and income levels. For example, Grossman (1972:57) estimated that total medical expenditures increased by about 7 per cent when income increased by 10 percent: Andersen and Benham (1970:85) found that a 10 percent increase in permanent income in creased expenditure for dental care by 10 percent. Phelps and Newhouse (1972:21) estimated that introducing a coinsurance rate of 25 percent reduced physician visits by 32 percent and expen diture for physician services by 28 percent. Scitovsky and Snyder (1972:10, 16-17) used the same data to show that coinsurance pay ments reduced the services consumed by nonprofessionals more than the services rendered to professional persons. In other words, coinsurance not only restrains utilization of services across all in come levels but has a more restrictive impact on low-or moderateincome groups than on their more affluent counterparts.
These studies suggest that the policy of reducing excess de mand through cost-sharing requirements could be successful at least in the near term. However, the long-run consequences are, thus far, unknown. In explaining and justifying their health in surance experiment, Newhouse (1974a; 1974b) and Orr (1974) out lined what knowledge they hope we shall gain from the experiment that will be conducted over three to five years. Among other things, we shall learn: (1) whether longitudinal studies uphold the results on income and price sensitivity obtained from crosssectional studies; (2) what are the differences in utilization response of different population groups, especially of groups that differ in health status; (3) whether, and to what extent, cost sharing restricts medically necessary utilization or does not restrict paidfor, though medically unjustified, utilization.
Cost-sharing requirements, if used as a rationing device, should be equally restrictive for all income groups. The treatment of medical exemptions under the federal income tax counteracts the restraining effects to be expected from a cost-sharing policy; and because the tax schedule specifies increasing marginal tax rates, the income-tax exemption provides a greater subsidy (or tax expenditure) to the affluent and economically comfortable than to their less well-off peers. Also, as currently structured, cost-sharing requirements are insensitive to income over a considerable range; their amounts are the same for different income levels and are, therefore, becoming gradually less restrictive as income increases.
Summer 1975 / Health and Society / MMFQ Under these circumstances, if the cost-sharing policy attains its goal, it does so by inducing an inequitable distribution of medical care; it restricts the consumption of health care services by the moderate-and lower-middle income persons more than that of their high-and upper-middle-income peers. Such a policy diverts program benefits from persons who are in a weak economic posi tion to those who are in strong positions, well off and affluent.
With this problem in mind, a case can be made that cost sharing amounts should be adjusted to reflect income differences over the entire income scale and not only for the very poor and in digent segments of the population. Yet, such an adjustment would be difficult and costly to implement. However, a modified form of an income-related cost-sharing policy can be adopted. Such a policy would base on income the level of patients' upper expense limit. And, as has often been suggested, the tax apparatus could be used to equalize the burden of direct personal medical expenditure. Specifically, the ceiling on patient liability could be set as a fixedincome share, and not as a fixed dollar amount; tax credits or re funds could be given to offset any payments that would exceed the specified income share.5 This policy would guarantee that the por tion of income allocated to paying medical bills is the same across all income classes; and that no economic unit would spend an in ordinate amount of its resources on health care services. Equal re lief from cost would prevail at the upper limit of medical expen diture, and the prospect of a heavy financial burden resulting from prolonged illness would be equally averted by everyone, rather than inequitably by only a chosen few.
Such a policy, though it guarantees that the upper limit on pa tients' payment is set equitably, would still maintain inequitable restrictions below the ceiling; and these, in turn, could discourage medically desirable (preventive) or necessary (early detection) utilization. Considering the nature of medical care, it is at least questionable whether financial restraints are as acceptable a method of rationing as they appear to be for some other consumer goods. Health care services do not yield any gratification similar to 5Karen Davis provides the following example: Suppose the upper expense limit is set at 10 percent of income, and a family incurs $4,000 of medical expenses. If an nual income is $20,000, the family is entitled to a $2000 tax credit; but if annual in come is $40,000, the family is not entitled to any tax credit. (See Fried et al., 1973: 118-119.) that derived from other consumer services. Also, they are not purchased or obtained in the same manner. The potential customers in the market for health care services are not often knowledgeable in medical matters, and they can find no "con sumer reports" to serve as guides through the complexity of medical technology. Thus, even when they are very costconscious, the patients are not equipped to serve as cost controlling agents unless they stay out of the medical-services market altogether. Once a patient enters the health care delivery system, it is the physician who, in effect, determines the quantity and quality of services to be consumed. Hence, a case can be made that physicians, and not their patients, should be given incentives to control the market and prevent wasteful use of scarce resources because only the physicians are well equipped to do so. 
Conclusion
Insurance as a payment mechanism is designed to provide relief from large medical bills and remove the specter of economic ruin. But the threshold of hardship differs with income and, therefore, the degree of relief is quite unequal when medical care is financed through risk-based premiums and fixed cost-sharing amounts. A government-mandated national health insurance program could be expected to guarantee equal relief from cost and equal opportunity to receive benefits for all citizens, because illness strikes rich and poor, and the medical technology cannot often be tailored to fit in come size. The role of financing arrangements in attaining this goal through shaping the national health insurance system is obviously important. What is called for is a policy which (1) removes the nex us between the use of health care facilities and the ability to pay for them, (2) bases the cost of medical care on income so that they are equitably shared, and (3) achieves this equitable distribution with the least cost to the paying public.
With equity considerations in mind, some of the major bills specify a system of multitier plans that are differentiated either by employment status or by age or by income. However, under such a complicated system, a fair distribution of medical care could be achieved only at a considerable administrative effort. A single plan which is universally applicable to the total population would be less
